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Chapter 11 – The road to the new 
Australian Copyright Act  
 
The 1960s 
A long delay in implementation 
Completed in 19591 the Spicer Report met public indifference. The 
newspapers and Parliament said nothing. The Attorney General, 
Garfield Barwick, kept the report “under consideration” for 14 months, 
before informing the House of Representatives in April 1961 that he 
intended to call for public submissions on the Committee’s findings.  
Barwick’s dilatoriness perhaps owed something to external interference. 
Sometime in 1960, he prepared a draft cabinet submission 
recommending the preparation of a copyright bill based on the report’s 
recommendations but the draft went no further. The recording and 
broadcasting industries were disappointed with the details of the report 
recommendations, and probably pressured Ministers to postpone 
legislative action. 
At any rate, in 1961, Barwick announced that the “representations 
indicate that perhaps the committee had not sufficient material before 
it and that additional material which is now available might have altered 
its conclusion.” He made plain that no-one should expect rapid 
progress towards a bill. At budget estimates hearings, Barwick reported 
that the task of assimilating new material, and reviewing the report 
findings burdened his department. His own priorities seemed to lie 
elsewhere: “I must confess for my part that I have not attempted to 
deal with it [the material] finally, and it cannot be expected that any 
legislation will be presented during the life of this Parliament.” 
In April 1962, he told Gough Whitlam, Labor Deputy Leader, that he 
hoped to introduce copyright legislation in the autumn session of 1963 
– hardly a promise of alacrity. No legislation emerged, and in April 
1964 the Liberal Coalition Government appointed Barwick Chief 
Justice of the High Court. Towards the close of 1964, Whitlam 
                                                     
1 Signed 22 December but only released to the public February 1961.  
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reminded his successor, Billy Snedden, of the Government’s inaction, 
again posing the question – when did the Government intend to 
introduce legislation? 
The evidence of Coalition laxity could not denied and Snedden 
admitted the tardiness of progress towards a bill. He said: “I am 
considering the Committee’s report and the representations which have 
been received from interested persons and organisations. I am unable 
to say, at this stage, when a Bill will be introduced.” The Government 
made no promises and the question of copyright legislation dropped 
from public notice. 
The delay in official response to a significant report on legislative 
reform is astonishing, yet, Whitlam’s questioning aside,2 the Opposition 
seemed indifferent to the question of reform. Only in 1967, when the 
Government at last introduced a bill did Labor MPs again discuss 
copyright in Parliament. It took a new Attorney General, Nigel Bowen, 
to precipitate action. He swiftly withdrew the 1967 bill after protests 
from various interested groups, and in May 1968, introduced revised 
legislation. A month later, Parliament passed the new bill, a mere nine 
years after completion of the Spicer Report. 
The reasons for delay 
The remarkable delay between report and legislation suggests the 
unimportance of the Australian broadcasting and recording markets 
compared with those of Britain. In Australia, the great driving force of 
broadcasting policy in Britain, the market for sporting entertainment, 
remained relatively miniscule and untapped. Entertainers and sporting 
organisations exerted negligible influence. In Britain, the explosion  
of popular culture, facilitated by the 1956 Act, turned the  
copyright industries into economic giants with needs that politicians  
did not ignore.  
Perhaps because so much of Australia’s own popular culture derived 
from foreign sources, the broadcasting and recording interests felt less 
compulsion than their British counterparts to accommodate the needs 
of entertainers and sports promoters. When the British sports 
promoters were shaking up the BBC in the 1950s, Australian 
broadcasters and record and film companies, relying on a steady  
stream of foreign content, were settling into mutually satisfactory 
                                                     
2 The questions formed part of a more general attack on the Government’s 
tardiness in implementing promises and producing legislation.  
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commercial arrangements, despite the deficiencies they perceived in the 
copyright law.  
The arrangements worked, and copyright industries in Australia seemed 
unconcerned that custom, rather than statute, underpinned their 
commercial relationships. Record companies now recognised that the 
radio broadcasters were played an indispensable role in increasing sales. 
Despite their protestations to the Spicer Committee and the 
Government, they were willing to accept the broadcasting of records 
without payment. Their equanimity is not surprising. According to the 
Labor MP, Rex Connor, EMI (Australia) Ltd earned 45 per cent on 
capital in 1966–67. For their part, the broadcasters knew that 
advertising charges generated ample revenue to pay for performance 
fees for the playing of records.  
As for the television broadcasters – the ABC and commercial stations – 
they benefited handsomely from their broadcasting licences and did not 
seem worried that they could not control commercial re-broadcasting, 
diffusion or the playing of broadcasts for profit in places of 
entertainment. This was so even though the British example showed 
that these modes of receiving broadcasts for commercial and (in the 
case of diffusion via wires) private purposes, if regulated, were sources 
of lucrative licensing fees.  
Once again, the difference in the Australian approach could be ascribed 
to the relative smallness of the Australian market for re-broadcasting 
and diffusion services: the size of prospective returns from licensing 
fees did not automatically excite commercial broadcasters already 
profiting from advertising revenue. 
The languorous mood in commercial life merely reflected the torpor of 
the political scene. In Canberra, the counterculture and social protest, if 
they made sense at all, were dimly perceived as the symptoms of a 
temporary sickness infecting the coastal cities. Day by day, a 
Government in office since 1949 slipped further into stuporous 
indifference. Few in its ranks were capable of the difficult, sustained 
work of creating complex legislation. For most of the 1960s, between 
the release of the Spicer Report and the passage of the Copyright Act, 
the Liberal Coalition Government adopted a laggardly approach to 
legislation.  
Not all Ministers were apathetic. The arrival of Nigel Bowen as 
Attorney General in 1966 seems to have worked as a catalyst, 
galvanising his department to push ahead with copyright law reform. 
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Unlike his predecessors, Bowen had the stomach to oversee the 
development of what he described to the Australian Financial Review in 
1967 as “a long and complex bill”. He faced a difficult task.  
Even Barwick, who did not shirk the grind of legal practice, seemed 
happy to avoid the work of drafting a copyright bill. His interests 
perhaps lay elsewhere, but the readiness of so determined an individual 
to avoid the difficult task of creating the new copyright statute  
testifies to Bowen’s achievement. Barwick, though an outstanding 
advocate, performed indifferently as Attorney General, and may have 
lacked the imagination to understand the deep implications of 
copyright law reform.  
His successor, Billy Snedden, regarded by many colleagues as a 
superficial thinker, did more than Barwick to prepare the way for 
legislation, but he was not the man to pull together complex threads of 
policy. On 20 April 1966, the task fell to the new Attorney General 
Bowen. He asked Cabinet for approval to prepare a copyright bill and 
his colleagues agreed that “legislation be prepared to give effect to the 
substance of the report of the Copyright Law Review Committee.”  
Role of Nigel Bowen 
So far as the enactment of copyright legislation is concerned, Bowen 
must be judged Australia’s most successful Attorney General. An 
exceptional lawyer, he displayed some of the weaknesses of other 
Attorneys who administered the Copyright Act. His understanding of 
issues of policy sometimes seemed weak, perhaps because he, like most 
lawyers, received little schooling in the history of legislation. He could 
be inconsistent and he failed to grasp the evil effects for Australian 
consumers of import controls. On the other hand, he showed depths 
of intellect and fortitude rarely shared by his predecessors. Past 
Attorneys who, nominally or actively, oversaw the passage of copyright 
legislation faced fewer challenges and dealt with far fewer organised 
interest groups.  
Isaac Isaacs, the Attorney at the time of the 1905 Act, took no part in 
the copyright debates of that year. Senator John Keating, Minister 
Without Portfolio, oversaw the preparation of the Act and steered it 
through the Senate. Billy Hughes, Attorney in 1912 when Parliament 
passed the new Copyright Act, husbanded much legislation through 
Parliament. But the 1912 Copyright Act incorporated the British 
copyright legislation and involved uncomplicated drafting. John 
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Latham, who supervised the enactment of two minor changes to the 
legislation, chose not to support the main recommendations of the 
Owen Royal Commission. Had he done so, implementation would 
have called for significant revision of the Copyright Act, and possibly 
its overhaul.  
Bowen, on the other hand, contended with the consequences of the 
Government’s long neglect of the Spicer Report. He started the process 
of consultation over again and controlled the process of creating 
legislation to supersede an obsolete statute. Apart from the difficulty of 
drafting provisions acceptable to contending factions, the scale of 
commercial and public interests affected by copyright legislation called 
for the utmost political skill and intellectual endeavour in the 
preparation of the new law. 
As a lawyer, Bowen ranked alongside Latham. Unlucky not to be 
appointed to the High Court bench, he became the first Chief Judge of 
the Federal Court in 1977. Another Attorney General called him, in 
2001, “one of the great lawyers of the last century”.3 Intellectual 
capacity, however, only promised that Bowen would grasp the material 
before him and distil argument into principle. Reform called for 
something more. For nearly a decade, Latham presided over the most 
poisonous commercial wrangling in Australian copyright history, and 
when the opportunity for reform presented itself, flew the coop for the 
High Court bench. Bowen, however, seized the mettle and did not 
falter. Determination, as much as intellectual brilliance, marked his 
short initial tenure as Attorney, and the Copyright Act stands as his 
major achievement.4  
The Government abandoned Bowen’s first Copyright Bill in 1967 and 
the response to the new bill introduced in 1968 testifies to Bowen’s 
achievement. Gil Duthie, a veteran Labor MP, congratulated him 
fulsomely for his “energy in getting this Bill before the House.”  
Duthie went on to “congratulate also his staff and the draftsmen  
who burnt the midnight oil to bring these clauses together in this 
mammoth document of 249 clauses.” He said they “achieved a miracle 
                                                     
3 Speech by Bob Ellicot, QC, celebrating his 50 years at the Sydney Bar, 17 
November 2000. Julian Leeser reported in the Sydney Morning Herald on 1 January 
2003 that the Prime Minister William McMahon wanted to appoint Bowen to the 
High Court in 1972. Fearing that his Government would lose the by-election for 
Bowen’s seat, he instead appointed Anthony Mason to the bench. Mason became 
the Chief Justice in 1987. 
4 He was Attorney from 1966 to 1969 and again in 1971. 
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… in producing this most difficult and complex measure.” According 
to Duthie, the only other legislation of similar size to pass through  
the chamber in his 21 years of parliamentary service was the Trade 
Practices Bill. 
A year earlier, the Fairfax newspapers welcomed Bowen’s initiative in 
bringing copyright legislation to Parliament. The Sydney Morning Herald 
stated in an editorial, “[i]t is a matter for reproach to several 
Governments that the recommendations of the Spicer Committee have 
for so long been gathering dust” – but no reproach could be levelled at 
Bowen. The Copyright Bill, said the Herald, “deserves a hearty welcome 
even though it is unlikely to attract much publicity.” The Australian 
Financial Review expressed equally positive sentiments: it said Bowen’s 
legislation “should finally lift Australia into the second half of the 20th 
century in regard to copyright.” 
Interest groups  
The first task Bowen faced in 1966 involved considering the 
submissions made to the Government following Barwick’s call in 1961 
for comments on the Spicer Report. These pitted broadcasters against 
the owners of copyright works, especially in relation to so-called 
“ephemeral” recordings. They also raised again the vexed question of 
the performance right in records. The Spicer Committee 
recommended, consistent with Article 11bis(3)5 of the Brussels 
amendments to the Berne Convention, that broadcasters be entitled to 
make “not more than one” temporary recording of works authorised 
for broadcast. Such recordings were “purely to facilitate the 
broadcasting of copyright material” and were to be destroyed within six 
months of recording. The recommendation, however, pleased neither 
broadcasters nor copyright owners. 
The Australian Federation of Commercial Broadcasting Stations6 
submitted that broadcasters should be allowed to make multiple copies 
of the original ephemeral recording and that in addition, the right 
should extend beyond reproduction of works, and include commercial 
records. The Copyright Owners Reproduction Society, on the other 
                                                     
5 It shall, however be a matter for the legislation of the countries of the Union to determine the 
regulations for ephemeral recordings made by a broadcasting body by means of its own facilities and 
used for its own emissions. The preservation of these recordings in official archives may, on the 
ground of their exceptional documentary character, be authorised by such legislation. 
6 Renamed the Federation of Australian Broadcasting Stations.  
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hand, protested against the “sweeping abrogation of the Author’s right 
over the mechanical recording of his works” implied by the ephemeral 
recording right. Broadcasters would not confine themselves to using 
ephemeral recordings to facilitate broadcasting: the recordings were 
used “for a multiplicity of reasons none of which is essential to the 
ability of the Broadcaster to broadcast music.” 
The dispute pointed to the new question confronting policymakers. 
Once rights were granted, to what extent should they be qualified? In 
the present case, should the right to authorise the recording of a work 
be qualified in any way that denied remuneration to the holder of the 
right? The owners of musical copyright were understandably nervous. 
In their eyes, the history of compulsory licensing told a story of 
usurpation that made an industry rich and artists poor.  
The CORS submission stated that authors were “most anxious to see 
that history does not repeat itself in any new enactment appearing to 
convey a minor part of the Author’s right … and then find that a major 
part of the right has been given away forever.” CORS agreed with the 
restriction on ephemeral recordings and asked “why the record 
manufacturer should be placed in a better position than the author of 
the music in this respect.” 
Why indeed. The Spicer Committee discussed the question of 
ephemeral recordings in detail and explained why record manufacturers 
should be treated differently from the authors of works. Its 
recommendation seemed to flow from a simple willingness to heed the 
wishes of the most powerful commercial faction. Even as early as 1961, 
the exemption of records from the Committee’s proposal on ephemeral 
recording looked strange.  
As the broadcasters indicated, the claim that they would make 
ephemeral recordings to avoid buying records was risible. It was also a 
non-sequitur. Commercial radio broadcasters and record companies 
alike were interested in revenue, and as the 1960s blossomed it  
became clear they shared a relationship of wondrous mutual  
benefit. Advertising revenues and record sales engendered by  
top-of-the-pops broadcasting made the right to make ephemeral 
recordings small cheese. 
Radio broadcasters returned to the question of the performing right in 
records. In their submission to the Government, they stressed the 
terms of the draft conventions on neighbouring rights drawn up by the 
ILO in 1956, UNESCO in 1957 and the draft Hague Convention of 
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1960. None, they said, “ever considered that the manufacturers should 
have more than a simple right to remuneration in respect of secondary 
uses.” In other words, a record company might charge for the playing 
of records by broadcasters but could otherwise place no conditions on 
their use. 
The broadcasters’ association next raised the question of out-of-
copyright films. The Spicer Committee recommended that owners of 
copyright in works used in films in which the copyright has expired 
should not be allowed to prevent the screening or playing of the film in 
public. Broadcasters now sought modification of the British provision 
recommended for adoption in Australia to permit television 
broadcasting of out-of-copyright films. 
The British Joint Copyright Council, an umbrella group of copyright 
owner organisations, which argued that if a copyright work used in a 
film survived the film copyright, its owner was entitled to control re-
screenings, vehemently opposed them. But as it happened, old films 
were to be increasingly used by television networks as “filler” with the 
result the right sought by the British Copyright Council would become 
increasingly less valuable commercially. The real issue for the 
broadcasters was securing rights to recently produced films and this 
depended on contract bargaining. 
One other topic exercised both the broadcasters and copyright owners. 
This was the work of the Copyright Tribunal. APRA welcomed the 
creation of the Tribunal and expressed concerned merely that 
legislation should encourage minimisation of formalities in proceedings. 
In particular, it requested that the legal rules of evidence be waived in 
hearings. Broadcasters, however, were unhappy with the Committee’s 
recommendations about jurisdiction.  
The Committee proposed that the Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear 
performing right disputes between users and three types of licensor. In 
the case of works, individual owners, such as publishers, would not 
have standing before the Tribunal. Only collective rights organisations, 
such as APRA, could take part in proceedings. As the Committee 
explained, the Gregory Committee proposed that a copyright tribunal 
be constituted to deal only with cases in which the licensor of works 
exercised monopoly or quasi-monopoly control over the performing 
right. With this proposal, the Spicer Committee agreed.  
In the case of disputes over the performing right in sound recordings 
or television broadcasts, the Spicer Committee recommended that the 
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owner of copyright, or any organisation, could initiate or contest 
Tribunal actions. The broadcasters pointed out that if jurisdiction did 
not extend to the individual owners of copyright works, they could find 
themselves at the mercy of individual music publishers who could levy 
fees in the knowledge that the Tribunal would not restrain them.  
Meanwhile, APRA found cause for concern in the Committee’s 
proposal for the commissioner of a work and its creator to share 
control of the work. The topic of commissioned works caused much 
debate in Britain years earlier and the Committee’s plan for the 
commissioner to control only uses of the work related to the purpose 
of the commission. With eyes fixed on the problems of proving 
ownership of some musical works in its repertoire, APRA declared the 
proposed scheme unworkable. Instead, it asked for the law to 
recognise, “as a matter of general principle”, that in the absence of 
contrary written agreement, copyright in the commissioned work 
remained the property of the creator. 
All these concerns Bowen took into account in 1966 as he came to 
grips with the task of preparing the new copyright legislation. He 
wasted no time. In April, Cabinet accepted, “subject to the 
modifications indicated in the Submission”, his proposal to implement, 
in legislation, the recommendations of the Spicer Report. With forensic 
precision, he set about the arduous task of consulting interest groups 
and overseeing his department’s preparation of a copyright bill. 
The 1967 Copyright Bill 
Commissioned works, ephemeral recordings and the 
Tribunal 
In May 1967, the Parliamentary Draftsman sent a memorandum to 
Cabinet’s Legislation Committee that summarised 14 “more 
significant” modifications to the legislative proposals of the Spicer 
Committee. In its treatment of commissioned works, the Bill followed 
the British Act, providing that the copyright in commissioned 
engravings, photographs and portraits belonged to the commissioner.  
The Parliamentary Draftsman rejected the Spicer Committee’s scheme 
of dividing copyright in commissioned works as impractical. The 
drafters also rejected APRA’s 1961 proposal that the creator 
presumptively own copyright. Instead, the bill provided that the creator 
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could restrain the use of the work for any purpose other than that 
specified by the commissioner at the time of the commission. 
In the case of ephemeral recordings, the bill gave broadcasters all they 
had asked for in 1961. They were authorised to make recordings  
of sound recordings and to make multiple copies – for the sole purpose 
of broadcasting – of each ephemeral recording. Moreover,  
broadcasting stations were entitled to make copies of ephemeral 
recordings made by other stations, provided they paid reproduction 
fees to the copyright owners.  
Most surprisingly, perhaps, the bill extended the period allowed for 
retaining ephemeral recordings prior to destruction from the six 
months proposed by the Spicer Committee to 12 months. Copyright 
owners sought a period of 28 days Bowen approved an extended 
period on the basis that patterns of country broadcasting made the 
longer period necessary. 
As for the Copyright Tribunal, the bill extended its jurisdiction beyond 
that envisaged by the Spicer Committee. The bill provided that in 
addition to adjudicating disputes over licence fees for the public 
performance of works, it would determine disputes over the equitable 
remuneration payable for recordings, ephemeral recordings, and the 
fees for the use of works.  
Performing right in records 
As preparation of the Copyright Bill, protracted by extensive 
consultations, extended into 1967, the performing right in records  
and the compulsory licence for recordings emerged as the principal  
subjects of controversy. The radio broadcasters still hoped to persuade 
the Government to dispense with provisions establishing the 
mechanical performing right, and the recording industry sought 
frantically to ensure that the Bill did not circumscribe the compulsory 
recording licence. 
In due course the music industry managed to persuade the 
Government to revise the provisions dealing with compulsory 
licensing. The broadcasters failed, perhaps because they were 
outgunned by a more powerful industry lobby. Adrian Sterling, the 
Deputy Director-General of the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry, lobbied the Government hard, holding 
meetings with Bowen and his senior departmental officer in February 
1967. The appearance of an IFPI representative in Australia no doubt 
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overshadowed the lobbying efforts of the broadcasters, whose efforts 
to win over Bowen were muted. Sterling, nowadays a distinguished 
legal academic and the author of major works on international 
copyright law, evidently impressed Bowen and Lindsay Curtis, the 
Senior Assistant Secretary of the Attorney General’s Department. 
Despite the protests of the broadcasters, the submitted bill 
implemented the Spicer Committee’s recommendation on the 
mechanical performing right.  
Perhaps no-one doubted that the Government would reach a legislative 
solution in favour of the recording industry. Since Cawardine over 35 
years before, broadcasters in Britain had come to view the payment of 
licence fees for playing records as a cost of business. The record 
companies argued that broadcasting lowered sales but as rock and roll 
and pop music took over musical tastes, they privately acknowledged 
an opposite truth. Radio broadcasting dramatically amplified sales. 
Soon enough the music industry eagerly supplied free samples of 
recordings to the radio stations.  
The radio broadcasters still wanted change for understandable reasons. 
Mechanical performance fees might be recouped from advertising 
revenue, but they were a significant and annoying impost. If the 
Government could be persuaded not to impose the burden, the radio 
stations’ accountants would breathe easier. Bowen, however, proved 
obdurate. He could sense a tacit commercial peace between the 
recording and radio industries and saw no reason to depart from either 
the recommendation of the Spicer Committee.  
Although the broadcasters’ association, the AFCBS, cited evidence of 
an international trend away from recognition of performing rights, 
Bowen’s advisors gave its arguments short shrift. A memorandum in 
August 1967 from Lindsay Curtis to the Secretary of his Department 
said disdainfully that the nations refusing to recognise the performing 
right were mostly “African countries”.  
He recommended that rather than consulting trends, departmental 
officers conduct a survey “to see what countries grant or do not this 
right.” Curtis acknowledged that the United States did not recognise 
performing rights, but he cited information supplied by IFPI’s Adrian 
Sterling in a letter received five months previously. Sterling helpfully 
pointed out that Record Industry Association of America “has now 
unanimously decided to fight for the performing right and is using 
every effort to achieve this aim.” 
 
308 
The compulsory recording licence 
IFPI and the Association of Australian Record Manufacturers 
encountered more difficulty trying to persuade the Government to 
amend provisions in the bill that reduced the scope of the compulsory 
licence. The bill did not permit record companies to record works 
under the licence if the original recordings were not made or imported 
into Australia.  
In this respect, to the chagrin of the record industry, the legislation 
emulated equivalent provisions in the 1956 British Copyright Act. The 
British Act of 1911 allowed for the compulsory recording of works 
originally recorded anywhere in the British dominions. Under the 1956 
Act, however, the compulsory licence applied solely to works recorded 
or imported into the United Kingdom. 
The 1967 bill adopted the wording of the British legislation, specifying 
that the compulsory licensing provision only came into operation if 
records of a work were “made in or imported into Australia for the 
purpose of retail sale or with the consent of the owner of the copyright 
work.” The drafter’s intent could hardly be plainer: if the Australian 
rights’ holder withheld consent to the making or importing or 
recordings, record companies could not make compulsory recordings.  
In practice, manufacturers would find themselves unable to 
automatically record works if records of the work were not in the hands 
of Australian retailers. The provisions of the bill also spelt the end for 
the practice of recording, with the Australian copyright holder’s 
consent, works recorded and sold in the United States only. The record 
companies were furious at what they considered a catastrophic 
narrowing of the scope of the licence. The Attorney General’s 
Department relayed their sentiments to Bowen but neither he, nor his 
departmental officers, were moved. 
In a memorandum written at the end of August 1967, Lindsay Curtis 
told the Minister that the Association of Australian Record 
Manufacturers, “states that the existing practice in industry in Australia 
enables record manufacturers to make records of works under the 
present compulsory licensing provisions if these works have previously 
been recorded anywhere in the world by or with the consent of the 
owner of the Australian copyright.”  
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Bowen and Curtis supported the Spicer Committee’s argument that the 
rights of the Australian owner of copyright in a work were paramount. 
The Spicer Report said of the compulsory licence:  
To the extent that it does operate we do not think it unreasonable that those who in 
Australia seek to enjoy benefits conferred by Australian law should do so by 
manufacturing records in Australia and thus contribute to the stability of that 
section of our manufacturing industry. 
Applying the Committee’s logic, the department decided that the 
Australian rights holder must control the recording process. The first 
recording of a work in Australia (or the authorised importation of a 
recording) not the existence of foreign recordings, governed the 
operation of the compulsory licence. Bowen took an active interest in 
the question of compulsory recording, revealing a disposition towards 
authors’ rights. In departmental instructions, he informed Curtis that 
the Australian owner of copyright in works must be protected against 
derogation of rights. In March 1967, he told Curtis that Australian 
copyright owners should not “be made subject to what is done 
elsewhere with the consent of the owner of the copyright in that place”.  
A few months later, in September, he told Curtis that he would not 
accept proposals to allow record companies to import records into 
Australia for the purpose of making recordings of the embodied works. 
Curtis’s memorandum of late August explained why: importing records 
under the compulsory licence “might encourage importation at the 
expense of manufacture in Australia”.  
Bowen and Curtis evidently paid only fleeting attention to the history 
of copyright law-making. Throughout the 20th century, sometimes in 
leaps, sometimes little by little, the recording industry swept aside all 
opposition to its will. Curtis’s departmental predecessor, Joe Tipping, 
realised something of this truth when 35 years earlier he told John 
Keating that APRA was a “lamb” compared to “the gramophone 
companies lion”. Sure enough, in the months after the introduction the 
first Copyright bill on 18 May 1967, Bowen learnt that his position 
could not be sustained. 
His refusal to allow the industry to import records to circumvent the 
limitations in the new provisions suggested that he shared the belief 
that the rights of copyright owners were inviolable. From this 
perspective, it mattered little that the primary right to control the 
reproduction of copyright material does not logically presuppose a right 
to control the distribution of that material.  
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Bowen and his advisors did not ask themselves difficult questions 
about import restrictions. Why should the Australian rights-holder who 
withheld consent to compulsory recording, be permitted to prevent the 
importing of records made legitimately overseas? Why did the interests 
on the copyright owner take precedence over the public’s interest in 
receiving a broad variety of records at lower prices? No-one at the 
Attorney General’s Department bothered to think about the ill effects 
of monopoly.  
Officers otherwise willing to support the enactment of privileges for 
copyright industries now saw only a ravening industry depriving artists 
of their rights. Shortly, the industry itself would loudly proclaim the 
value of import controls preventing Australian retailers from importing 
records sold overseas. But who benefited from import controls 
mattered less than the harm they caused the public. Bowen failed to see 
that control over distribution, no matter who happened to be the 
copyright owner, worked against consumers. 
Instead, he, Curtis, and others, traversed the same path as the Spicer 
Committee. According to the Committee, only four per cent of records 
sold in Australia were recorded domestically and the remainder pressed 
locally from imported matrices of foreign records. According the 
Committee’s logic, an Australian matrice was better than a foreign one, 
and forcing local companies to rely on the consent of an Australian 
rights-holder’s consent to the making of a record would produce a 
domestic manufacturing industry.  
The Government relents 
The music industry did not retreat and IFPI and the Australian 
Federation of Record Manufacturers agitated furiously against the 
shrunken compulsory licence. Faced with a barrage of arguments, 
Curtis suggested to Bowen that the offending provisions in the 
copyright bill be revised. “Having regard,” he said in a memorandum, 
“to the fact that the existing practice seems to have worked and that the 
business of the record manufacturers is geared to this practice, I 
suggest that the Bill should be amended to reflect this practice.” 
Bowen described his reason for accepting Curtis’s advice in the 
blandest of terms. In his second reading speech for the 1968 Copyright 
Bill, he said simply that, after “full consideration of the arguments that 
were put by both sides I came to the conclusion that some changes 
should be made” to the compulsory licensing provisions. They now 
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applied if a work had, with the consent of the local copyright owner 
and for the purpose of retail sale, been recorded in, or imported into, 
the territory of any member of the Berne Union or the Universal 
Copyright Convention. 
As modified, the compulsory licensing provisions stipulated that 
owners could not indefinitely withhold consent to the first recording of 
works (other than musical scores for stage or film). 7 Owners suffered 
another shock. The Government decided not to increase the old rate of 
royalty payable on retail sales of records made under compulsory 
licence. Under the bill, the rate remained at 5 per cent, even though the 
Spicer Committee recommended that it be increased to 6.25 per cent 
and the higher rate applied in Britain from 1928.8  
Bowen reassured owners in his second reading speech that the 
Government did not regard the lower rate as immutable. But neither he 
nor his department were qualified to determine appropriate royalty 
rates. The task of fixing the rate, he said, would fall to the new 
Copyright Tribunal, which could comprehensively investigate value of 
money changes and market developments. 
Bowen and the import monopoly 
Bowen’s frank admission that his department was not equipped to 
determine the appropriate rate of royalty for records made under the 
compulsory licence showed the directness that characterised his 
conduct as Attorney General. He appeared less clear-sighted about the 
need for external consultation on another set of provisions that 
pertained far more to the welfare of Australian consumers. These were 
sections 37 and 102 of the bill, which prohibited the importation of 
copyright articles without consent of the copyright owner. 
Almost a decade previously, the Spicer Committee showed deplorable 
ignorance of the history of the import controls in Australia. Now 
Bowen too failed to grasp the truth that the controls were designed to 
protect the monopoly of British publishers over the distribution of 
books throughout the Empire. Bowen evidently knew nothing of the 
reaction of earlier Australian legislators to the import monopoly. The 
                                                     
7 Bowen explained in his second reading speech that the reason for the exemption 
was that producers needed the scores to remain secret until release of the show or 
film.  
8 Under the British system the royalty was calculated by reference to the retail price 
exclusive of sales tax. In Australia the retail price included wholesale tax.  
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great parliamentary generation of 1905 rejected import controls, and 
John Keating, who displayed an unrivalled grasp of the history of 
imperial copyright law, spoke with passion and logic against the 
monopoly over distribution.  
Bowen focused attention on the importation provisions in 1967 
following ructions over the Government’s proposal to extend the 
application of sections 37 and 102 of the bill to importation for non-
commercial purposes. His department brought to his attention the 
discovery that an unwanted effect of the revision would be to revoke 
de facto freedoms hitherto enjoyed by libraries and broadcasters. 
Even though section 10 of the 1912 Act allowed the copyright owner 
to restrain the importation of works regardless of the purpose for 
which they were imported, in practice libraries imported books and 
records unhindered. Lawyers interpreted section 10 to apply to 
importation for the purpose of retail sale. The proposed revision to the 
bill overturned longstanding practices that, in the case of the libraries at 
least, could be said to facilitate the delivery of public benefits. 
Informed of the libraries’ import practices Bowen immediately rang the 
NSW State Librarian and discovered that the Library purchased many 
of its books from overseas. Armed with this information, he decided to 
retain existing practice. He felt, according to a departmental minute, 
that in the case of libraries, “there was no strong case for the English 
law on importation to be followed in Australia.” Local conditions were 
“significantly different” from those in the United Kingdom. Unlike 
Britain, Australia was “largely an importer of books, records, etc”.  
Bowen’s ignorance of Australian copyright history now prevented him 
from applying similar reasoning to analysing the import controls 
generally. John Keating, Joseph Vardon and David Gordon, the three 
men who spoke out most powerfully against import controls in 1912 
copyright debates, might have asked him a simple question. Why, if 
Australia was a net importer of copyright product, did the freedom to 
import items without the consent of the local rights-holder apply only 
to libraries?  
Even the libraries’ exception provided the public with only a partial 
benefit. Booksellers would be unable to import cheap copies of books 
produced overseas and the readers would pay higher prices for the 
books supplied by the local rights-holder. As Curtis pointed out to 
Bowen, the library amendment “would be more likely to benefit book 
publishers than anyone else.” Freeing libraries from the publishers’ 
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distribution stranglehold enabled them to import a wider variety of 
works at lower prices. But Bowen’s solicitude towards libraries did 
nothing to assist the purchasers of books and records in retail outlets. 
Like the Spicer Committee, Bowen and his department took for 
granted that its long history justified the import monopoly. None 
thought to examine that history critically. It was not until the 1980s  
and 1990s that the justification for the monopoly would be  
seriously examined and politicians forced to reconsider the frauds 
visited against the public interest by sections 37 and 102 of the 
Australian Copyright Act.  
In the meantime, the public accepted limited choice and high prices. 9 It 
seemed that for Bowen, like so many legislators who preceded and 
followed him, certain principles and laws of copyright were decrees 
inspired by providence. Believing in the virtue of laws created by 
Parliament they willingly elaborated principles without regard for  
their justification. 
In the case of the import monopoly, Bowen and his advisers fell prey 
to the false belief that time-honoured law is good law. Long trained in 
intellectual conformism, they did not understand that a law accepted 
for more than half a century may yet be rotten. The Australian public 
suffered the results of Bowen’s decision to retain the import monopoly. 
Copyright owners continued to control the supply of copyright product 
to Australia, and consumers continued to pay high prices for books and 
records, and later videos, DVDs and digital products. 
The debates of 1968 
Labor’s stand  
In the early history of Australian parliamentary debate over copyright, 
one or two individuals rose above their colleagues in insight, 
understanding and conviction. These figures were united by the hatred 
of monopoly. In 1905, Sir Josiah Symon invoked Macaulay’s warnings 
against monopoly to argue passionately against the lengthy posthumous 
term, and seven years later John Keating and David Gordon attacked 
the import monopoly with equal moral force. 
                                                     
9 Import restrictions on sound recordings were lifted in Australia in 1998 and 
government and consumer surveys tracked a steady fall in prices from that year. 
Restrictions on computer programs were lifted in 2003.  
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None of these men belonged to the Labor Party, which in 1912 
adopted a reactionary stance on the question of import controls. In 
1968, however, Labor politicians linked the rights of authors with the 
development of national identity, and attacked some of the monopoly 
rights conferred by copyright law.10 No speaker during the 1968 debates 
showed the intellectual and moral depth of Symon or Keating but a few 
shared their scepticism over the motives of those who argued for more 
and more rights.  
Labor MPs led the charge against key aspects of the 1968 Copyright 
Bill. They were led by Reginald Francis Xavier Connor, a massive, 
aggressive man twice convicted of assault and known by a variety of 
nicknames – “Al Capone” “King Kong”, “the Strangler”. According to 
a colleague, he “built a reputation for perspicacity on an impressive 
knowledge of chemistry, xenophobia, such profound non sequiturs as 
‘life is an equation in hydrocarbons’, and mumbo jumbo about an 
annual ‘energy budget’.”11  
Six years after the Copyright Bill, he engineered the Khemlani Loans 
Affair that led to his resignation and the fall of the Whitlam 
Government. Bombastic and menacing, Rex Connor did not restrain 
himself in parliamentary debate. He hurled intemperate abuse at the 
Government but he spoke with confused prescience about the effect of 
copyright laws in limiting future access to copyright material. He 
glimpsed the future through a glass darkly but at least he guessed 
something about later developments that his colleagues did not. He 
also spoke speciously about the Government’s obligation to artists, 
bringing to public notice a favoured theme of future Labor 
governments, the need to join copyright and cultural policy. 
“Time and space” 
In his remarks after Bowen’s second reading speech, Connor, the 
unmistakable polymath, referred to “the Pharisee of old”, Pope Pius 
XII, Marshall McLuhan and Gutenberg. The rapid recitation of sources 
to illustrate his points unfortunately distracted his audience from a 
deeper insight: Connor grasped, indistinctly, the future of copyright law 
as a means for regulating global communications.  
                                                     
10 They advocated ideas of cultural protection that neither Keating nor Gordon, 
both ardent advocates of the Australian interest, shared.  
11 Peter Walsh, Confessions of a Failed Finance Minister, Random House, 1995, pp19–
20.  
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Quoting McLuhan’s observation that a century of development in 
communications technology abolished “both time and space”, he noted 
that while the legislation “belatedly provides solutions to longstanding 
problems [of technology development] it fails utterly solve or to foresee 
those of the immediate future.” He correctly predicted that 
developments in video recording and computing would precipitate 
arguments for further copyright legislation, but more significantly, he 
exposed what copyright proponents regarded as a technical deficiency 
in the drafting of the Bill. 
The 1968 legislation vested in the owner exclusive control over the 
reproduction, broadcasting and diffusion (distribution via terrestrial 
wires) of copyright subject matter, extending copyright protection to 
the known methods of reproduction, as well as the technologies of 
broadcasting and transmission by wires. This drafting formula 
presented future legislators with a difficulty. Whenever copyright 
owners succeeded in securing the extension of copyright to new 
reproduction and distribution technologies, they were forced to amend 
the Copyright Act to vest control of the new technologies in the owner.  
In short, legislators played catch-up trying to ensure that copyright 
protection extended to all technologies that multiplied and 
disseminated copyright material. As Connor said, “radio, television,  
the modern phonograph recording industry, magnetic tape  
recorders, videotape, computers, new methods of printing, 
photocopying, satellites for communication and the transmission  
of entertainment programs, microfilming of books, and electronic 
diffusion services … have created new concepts of mass 
communication and new challenges even for nations which have 
progressively modified their law of copyright.”  
The Bill, he made clear in his remarks, did not comprehend all the 
possible modes of reproducing and disseminating copyright material. In 
modern parlance, its provisions were not “technology neutral”, that is, 
they could not be interpreted to apply to all conceivable future modes 
of production and communication. The Bill, said Connor, “fails utterly 
to meet even the problems associated with the minor innovations of 
the technological age.” If implemented, the legislation would “fail 
dismally to meet the more complex problems associated with man’s 
march forward in the vanguard of electronic invention.” Viewed from 
the perspective of whether the copyright legislation applied to new 
technologies, these criticisms were to some extent vindicated.  
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Only in 2000 did Australia overcome the problem – from the copyright 
owner’s perspective – of new technologies falling outside the ambit of 
copyright legislation. Major legislative amendments introduced a so-
called “technology-neutral” right of communication to the public, 
which replaced technology-specific dissemination rights. Copyright 
protection applied to any conceivable form of disseminating copyright 
material. The legislation also expanded the meaning of reproduction to 
include the digitisation of works and the conversion of digital works 
into a non-digital format.  
Having suggested that the piecemeal extension of copyright to new 
technologies meant that existing legislation would be inadequate to 
regulate a communications economy characterised by continual 
innovation, Connor went no further. He turned instead to the policy 
considerations that motivated the Opposition and Government. 
According to Connor, the governing Coalition, “obsessed with 
proprietary rights” stood for big business, and more specifically, the 
copyright industries. The Labor Party, by contrast, was “primarily 
interested in the plight of Australian authors, dramatists, composers 
and artists.” A tide of imported books, films, records and television 
shows swamped their work and they deserved “a greater percentage of 
the remuneration which would otherwise be flowing overseas, much of 
it for syndicated rubbish or worse”.  
The “little people”  
Connor’s colleague, Gilbert Duthie averred that the copyright 
industries “will look after themselves and they have the power to do 
so.” Labor would “think principally of the authors, dramatists, 
composers and artists.” The Copyright Bill reflected the politics of 
power: the record companies, broadcasters and publishers “walked the 
fastest, longest and most often to the door of the Attorney General.” 
These industries, said Duthie, “had changes made in the 1967 Bill and 
those changes are reflected in the Bill that is now before us.” 
Duthie declared his concern for “the little people, as I call them”. 
Echoing George Bernard Shaw’s comments in The Times in 1911 and 
1949, he said that the little people “do not have the financial might, the 
stocks and shares and the status in the community to exert pressure, 
but they sweat and sacrifice to create works of art.” Parliament, he 
insisted, “should think of them primarily in this legislation.” Between 
them, Connor and Duthie announced a distinct policy towards 
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copyright law which the Labor Party proclaimed for the next 30 years. 
The declamations, however, rang hollow.  
For 20 years before Duthie’s speech, cross-currents swirled around the 
coral edifice of authors’ rights, weakening the Berne Union’s many-
hued creation. Copyright law still acknowledged the primary 
entitlement of authors but the growth of industrial copyright and 
neighbouring rights presaged a new age. Governments of all political 
persuasions now lent their ears to corporations, not the little people.  
A policy of preferring “little people” to “big people”, the “rich 
industrialists” described by Bernard Shaw in 1911, is not to be derided. 
But Duthie’s conception of little people did not comprehend a larger 
group of ‘‘little people”, the great community of consumers who 
bought books and records and paid to see films. The Labor Party 
politicians seemed oblivious to the needs of the public. Preferment of 
Duthie’s little people inevitably meant disadvantage to the public. Many 
authors were no less grasping than industries and excessive privileges 
were invidious, whether in the hands of individuals or corporations.  
Cultural nationalism  
The little people doctrine justified the continuation of the import 
monopoly, which allowed copyright owners to restrict the supply of 
copyright product to Australia and fix the price of goods. Who paid for 
protection of the little people? Not the copyright industries, rich, 
powerful and well able, in Duthie’s words, to “look after themselves”. 
Connor supplied the Labor Party’s answer: government must subsidise 
those with an artistic vocation.  
The legislature must recognise that “a new economic status should be 
provided for creative artists now covered by the field of copyright.” 
Additionally, the governments of Australia must employ creators 
enabling them to “practise their callings within the public services.” 
Connor supplied an alarming summary of the role to be played by 
artistic public servants. “Here would be people,” he said, “speaking to 
the nation, moulding the national ethos, and providing the mainstream 
of a truly Australian cultural sentiment and national spirit.”  
If Australian voters wanted to free their country from the ancient curse 
of philistinism, they would have to accept the necessity for supporting 
artists in the public service. “The Australian market,” Connor declared, 
“has always been appallingly limited by population.” Limited demand 
meant that “with very few exceptions, no composer, author, dramatist 
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or artist can be assured, from within the limited Australian market, of 
an adequate return for the products of his creative talent and genius.”  
Connor’s grand vision conflated copyright and cultural policy. “Is it to 
be wondered,” he asked, “that there are critics of the impediments to 
Australia’s cultural development and maturity? Is it to be wondered that 
there are critics of the absence of a major Australian film industry?” 
Consumed by his vision of cultural revolution, Connor added a 
proviso. The new class of artist bureaucrats must be secluded from the 
temptations posed by the copyright industries. Quarantined from “the 
dead hand of sordid commercial calculation” they could concentrate on 
producing works that satisfied “the human mind thirsting for 
knowledge or works of creative talent and genius”. 
According to Connor, the bureaucrats would create a new Australia: 
The products of their talent, and in some cases genius, would then be available to the 
whole of the Australian people through modern electronic communication media, 
without the interposition of commercial interests whose exclusive objective is the 
extraction of maximum profit for themselves, with minimum return to those 
responsible for the creation of works of artistic, cultural and literary merit. 
 
Connor’s vision of a cultural nomenklatura created by copyright 
legislation perhaps owed something to his early affiliation with the 
Communist Party and membership of the communist-dominated 
Industrial Labor Party.12 In sketching the merging of copyright  
and cultural policy he anticipated the approach taken by future  
Labor Governments but his ideas went beyond anything envisaged by 
his Party. 
“God help the composer” 
Duthie commended Connor for his speech but he did not support the 
latter’s fantasy of a utopia created by artists. His ideas for copyright 
policy owed nothing to crypto-Marxian dreaming. Much more than 
Connor, he helped articulate the new Labor orthodoxy that placed 
“originators” at the forefront of policy. Duthie’s views represented a 
sane counterbalance to Connor’s, mainly because he did not assume a 
necessary connection between copyright regulation – designed 
principally to protect the economic interests of copyright owners – and 
                                                     
12 Connor was close to the Communist Party during his early political career. He 
joined the Industrial Labor Party in 1939, was a member of its central executive and 
a keen socialist.  
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the ideology of cultural development, which subordinated copyright 
policy to the goal of creating economic security for artists. 
Duthie felt that Copyright Bill was designed to benefit the copyright 
industries, especially the “record manufacturers, the big shots of the 
music industry”, as he called them. He wanted to ensure that the 
creators, without whom “there would be no ballets, no publishers, no 
music houses and no record companies”, received a fair share of the 
profits generated by the industries. The “big shots”, said Duthie, were 
“getting on very well”. He observed ruefully to other MPs that “I have 
not heard of many record manufacturers going out of business”.  
Duthie asked the House to consider the true purpose of copyright law. 
“What we have to understand,” he said, “and to think about is that is 
the originators who deserve basic protection in any legislation like this.” 
Unlike Connor, he made modest proposals to benefit creators. The 
Government, he believed, should continue to assist artists through 
institutions such as the Commonwealth Literary Fund and the Arts 
Council, but the only change to legislation he proposed was to increase 
the rate of statutory royalty payable for records sold to the figure of 
6.25 per cent recommended by the Spicer Committee. 
The rate was “anchored at 5 per cent in 1912” and he derided the 
Government’s proposal to leave future revision of the rate to the 
Copyright Tribunal. He was equally dismissive of the times specified in 
the Bill for review of the rate. The legislation provided that the 
Attorney General could request a review of the rate two years after the 
commencement of the Act and then five years after the first review. 
According to Duthie periods “of two years and five years are 
outrageously long before an appeal to the Tribunal may be heard.” 
Otherwise, Duthie accepted with resignation a Bill that indeed created a 
suite of rights that belonged to industries not authors. Unlike Connor, 
he adopted a constructive approach to the Bill. Whereas Connor spat at 
the “slovenly Government” for its failings in regard to copyright policy, 
Duthie offered congratulations.  
“We welcome this legislation,” he said. “It will do a lot to remove 
injustices. Where injustices remain the Copyright Tribunal will have to 
correct them.” The Tribunal, said Duthie, would be “composed of 
some of Australia’s top judges”. He ended his speech with a wry 
parting wish. “All I hope,” he said, “is that they are judges with musical 
souls. If they are not, God help the composers.”  
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The question of dissemination 
Not all Labor politicians concentrated on the needs of copyright 
creators. Gordon Bryant, a member of the National Library Council, 
hoped that “members will play close attention to the field of libraries 
and their particular duties in regard to this legislation.” Libraries 
disseminated knowledge and Parliament “must take good care that 
there is no inhibition of our use of any material that is about.” The 
legislature “ought not to throw [originators] to the wolves as has been 
done so often”, but government must pay attention to the needs of 
copyright users.  
Bryant reached a radical conclusion. “I am not even convinced,” he 
said, “that property rights in copyright should flow on after the death 
of an author.” Why, he asked, should royalties “have to be paid after an 
author has passed on?” If copyright died with its owner, the public 
benefited. If copyright works found their way more rapidly into the 
public domain, the public gained access to literature and music freely, 
or at least cheaply.  
The long posthumous term merely enriched individuals who played no 
part in the creation of copyright works. “I understand,” Bryant noted 
with disapproval, “that a great deal of money is still flowing into the 
coffers of the Shaw estate.” But he doubted whether his views would 
impress other legislators. It was doubtful, said Bryant that their 
“attitudes to copyright and the protection of people’s rights are 
adequate to the task.”  
Bryant asked a series of questions.  
In copyright, where does the interest lie? Does it lie necessarily with the author? In a 
dramatic work does it lie with the performers? If it is reproduced in printed form, 
does it lie with the publishers?  
 
The answer he considered straightforward. The copyright industries 
lobbied the politicians and copyright laws were now made for their 
benefit. In the case of books, the “odds seem to favour the publisher.” 
Why?  
He is likely to have the biggest interest. He is likely to have access to the corridors of 
power. He is likely to be more persuasive. So in the conflict of ideas, rights and  
so on … it is likely that the person who achieves the greatest success financially will 
be the publisher. 
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In the case of musical works, the record companies benefited more 
from the Copyright Bill than composers. The same applied to 
broadcasters. They, not the creators of broadcast works, gained 
significantly from the legislation.  
Bryant concluded with more questions that crystallised his sentiments. 
What are we to do about authors? How are we to encourage Australian authorship 
in the face of competition from overseas? Finally, what are we to do to protect the 
rights of customers who number more than 12 million? 
According to Bryant, “the customer outside is interested in the whole 
field.” More than anyone else in Parliament, Bryant articulated the need 
for copyright users, in a world dominated by copyright owners, to 
secure access to copyright material. He said of the user: 
He is interested in the works of dramatic art, in the right of access to sporting 
spectacles, in the right to read in public libraries when there is only one copy of a 
book available or perhaps when only a few copies of a book have been imported. 
Then there is the right of the student which at the present time, is probably one of the 
most compelling needs. 
Importation and price competition 
One Government MP expressed particular concern about the policy 
underlying the importation rules. Edward St John, a Coalition maverick 
shortly to stand as an Independent and lose his seat, repeated the old 
proposal, first rejected by the Spicer Committee, for importers to be 
permitted, under the terms of the compulsory licence to import records 
from overseas. He declared that it was “very necessary in the public 
interest that importers should not be held to ransom by the copyright 
owners, so that the Australian public may continue to enjoy the 
benefits of price competition.”  
St John knew he was steering an imprudent political course – he said 
later in his speech, “I do not care how many bridges I have burnt 
behind me” – and his arguments did not sway Bowen. By trying to 
defeat importation restrictions by revision to the compulsory licensing 
provisions, he made failure certain. The Spicer Committee rejected the 
idea of extending the compulsory licence to include importation of 
records for the reason that the production and distribution of records 
are two different processes. According to this logic, a right intended to 
prevent a production monopoly should not in principle be used to try 
to defeat a distribution monopoly. 
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St John would have done more benefit to the cause of defeating the 
import monopoly by drawing attention to the “great big blackmailing 
clause” referred to in the House by John Keating 56 years earlier.  
In the 1968 Bill, the blackmailing clause was section 37, and by 
exposing the inequity of the distribution monopoly it conferred on 
copyright owners, St John could have established a precedent, in the 
tradition of Keating and Gordon before him, for principled objection 
to import control. 
Performing right in records 
Another backbencher, Alexander Buchanan, who, like St John, ended 
his career as an Independent, criticised the provisions creating the 
mechanical performing right. A politician of considerable experience, a 
farmer, and an amusing straight-talker, Buchanan recited the history of 
radio broadcasting in Australia. He declared that radio broadcasters did 
not accept the obligation to pay fees for playing records. Broadcasting 
conferred a great benefit on record manufacturers:  
The value to the maker of exposure by broadcast and penetration by transistor to the 
mind of the teenager and other areas of vacuity is so great that broadcasting stations 
are inundated with free copies of new records in the same extravagant way as doctors 
are importuned with free samples of new drugs by medical detailers … Some stations 
do not play anything else than these jungle tunes, and far from getting any royalty on 
them the makers should be fined for inflicting them on a defenceless public. 
“This performing right,” said Buchanan, “is a monstrous distortion of 
the very basis of creative production and original authorship which 
copyright involves.” Buchanan could not see how the investment of 
skill, effort and money justified the award of copyright in records, let 
alone the mechanical performing right. He said: 
None of this so-called technical skill adds one note to the score or one word to the 
lyric … if it does cost money, the ordinary processes of business require that the 
maker should seek his reward by the sales he is able to make of his records.  
He declared the reasons given by Justice Maugham for his judgment in 
Cawardine “arrant nonsense”. In criticising Maugham’s discovery that 
legislation bestowed on the record industry a mechanical performing, 
he followed directly in the footsteps of a former Lord Chancellor and 
important legal reformer. Buchanan did not repeat Lord Jowitt’s 
disparaging summary of Maugham’s “unfortunate” decision in favour 
of the Gramophone Company but his own criticisms brought to mind 
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those of the Labour peer. They may also have rung true to Bowen were 
he listening to them as a lawyer and not a politician.  
Buchanan pointed out that the mechanical process of producing a 
record involved not a shred of originality or artistry. As conceived by 
the Berne Union and the British and Australian legislators of the early 
20th century, copyright subsistence depended on originality. Only by 
corrupting principle could the legislature agree to vest copyright in the 
so-called ‘subject matter other than works’. When British legislators 
established the compulsory licence in 1911, they created a species of 
copyright that did not include the positive rights, including the 
performing right, vested in the owner of copyright in works.  
For the most part, Buchanan’s comments fell on deaf ears, though at 
least one other Coalition backbencher shared his views. Ian Allan, a 
Country Party backbencher who worked as a radio announcer for the 
ABC in the late 1940s, was, like St John and Buchanan disenchanted 
with the Government. Like them, he criticised the Bill not because he 
wished to damage the Government but for reasons of principle. He 
complimented Bowen on the legislation and spoke in positive terms 
about the Bill as a whole. But when he came to provisions creating the 
mechanical performing right, he spoke vehemently against “this part of 
the legislation which forms only a tiny fraction of the whole Bill”. 
Bowen, said Allan, knew very well that he considered this “one item in 
the Bill” to be “highly objectionable” and that “I cannot see any 
rational explanation for it”. He reminded his listeners that the British 
gramophone industry asked the Gorrell Committee in 1909 to 
recommend legislation to create a mechanical performing right. The 
industry, said Allan, wanted to boost record sales by encouraging the 
public performance of music. It needed the right, he claimed, to ensure 
that the playing of records in places of public entertainment would not 
be judged an infringement of copyright in works performed. Legislators 
enacted provisions permitting compulsory recording but they never 
intended for the industry to prevent others from playing records in 
public or demand fees for public performance. 
According to Allan, only the peculiar reasoning of Justice Maugham, 
influenced by the cunning arguments of Sir Stafford Cripps, 
transformed a right to perform records in public to a right to control 
the public performance of records. But, said Allan, neither reason nor 
justice supported statutory recognition of the right identified by 
Maugham. To pass laws recognising the mechanical performing right, 
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he said, “offends my common sense”. Allan quoted the 35-year-old 
Owen Report, which emphatically rejected the record companies’ 
proposal for legislation to recognise the right. In the report, Justice 
Owen declared that: 
The law should be made clear on this point, and, in the opinion of this Commission, 
the performing right now claimed by some record manufacturers is unreasonable, and, 
if in law it exists, this right should be abolished. 
 
Allan attacked the reasons given by the Spicer Committee for 
supporting statutory recognition of the mechanical performing right. 
The Committee gave three reasons: the manufacture of records 
involved technical skill above that required in ordinary manufacturing 
processes, broadcasters relied on playing records to attract listeners, 
and the manufacturers invested significant amounts of capital to 
establish production facilities. According to the Committee, the 
investment of skill and capital, and the reliance of broadcasters on the 
supply of records, demanded legislation to create a right of public 
performance in records.  
The “reasons given by the Spicer Committee,” said Allan “are really 
unsound.” He pointed out that, “on all scores the manufacturer of a 
record is in no better or worse category than the [ordinary] 
manufacturer.” Allan implied that all manufacturers could claim to 
exercise special production skill. “Even the man who moulds a 
toothbrush,” he said, “perhaps has some special claims to creative 
ability. His creative talents are called into use in designing the mould of 
the toothbrush.”  
Nor should the fact that radio stations depended on playing records to 
attract listeners justify a claim for public performance fees. The 
advantage cut both ways. In the absence of broadcasting, record 
manufacturers would find they sold fewer records. The record 
companies had no need to antagonise broadcasters by demanding fees 
for an activity that benefited them as much as the radio stations. EMI, 
according to Allan, “pays a fee of $200,000 to Radio Luxembourg, a 
commercial station situated in Europe, to play and to popularise its 
records, because EMI knows that the way it can get its records sold to 
the public is by having them played by commercial stations.” 
Allan disposed of the argument that industry investment called for 
statutory protection. The industry in Australia flourished in the absence 
of the mechanical performing right, and in any case, the contribution of 
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the record companies to Australian industry was small. The majority of 
investment behind the production of records sold in Australia occurred 
outside Australia. Companies imported 80 per cent of records played in 
Australia. Performance fees collected for the playing of these records, 
said Allan, would be mostly remitted to foreigners. 
The Spicer Committee’s case for the mechanical performance right, 
said Allan, “was a very weak effort indeed.” No reasonable person 
could gainsay Allan’s logic in his dissection of the Spicer Committee’s 
arguments. Analysed so starkly, they seemed risible. His description of 
the gramophone industry’s quest for recognition of the performing 
right in Britain was not wholly accurate – the industry first evinced a 
strong interest in the right at the end of the 1920s – but taken together 
his arguments against the relevant provisions in the Bill powerfully 
refuted the Government’s reasons for recognising the right.  
Buchanan’s last words on the subject no doubt raised a smile on the 
faces of others in the House. “Surely,” he said, “law should be based on 
logic and rational thinking.” 
The modern case for regulation 
The debate in the House of Representatives ended, Reginald Wright, 
the Minister for Works, introduced the Bill in the Senate. His speech 
mostly repeated Bowen’s second reading speech. His proved more 
illuminating, however, because, unlike Bowen, he carefully explained 
the policy underlying the legislation.  
In so doing, he elaborated the balance theory of copyright. The main 
factions in contemporary copyright debate would affirm his statement 
of the law’s function would. Wright can thus be said to have articulated 
in Australia, perhaps for the first time, present orthodoxy about the 
purpose of regulation. 
Copyright legislation, he said, must articulate “a reasonable 
compromise in cases where there are conflicting interests”. It must 
preserve the incentive to produce copyright material by protecting the 
legitimate economic interests of producers and balance against the 
interests of the producers the needs of the authors. 
Wright stopped short of acknowledging dissemination of information 
as the primary goal of copyright policy. He never mentioned the 
public’s interest in comprehensive access to information, described by 
Gordon Bryant as the “people’s rights”. Nor did he share the Labor 
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Party’s preference for authors over producers. While the Government 
wanted “to see that authors receive due payment for use of their 
material” it recognised that “existing practices and existing relations in 
industries which depend upon copyright material cannot be ignored.” 
“Without this protection,” said Wright, “it would not be likely that 
large sums would be invested in the production of books and 
magazines or the publishing of music.” Industries were also users of 
copyright material, and in this capacity, must be treated tenderly. The 
“broadcasting and television industry, the record industry and much of 
the entertainment industry” all “depend on being able to use copyright 
material on reasonable terms.” 
Remarkably, Wright’s speech made no reference to the interests of the 
public. He seemed oblivious to the possibility that members of the 
public could use copyright material. For Wright, “users” were 
broadcasters and the entertainment industries. The purchasers of books 
and records, the viewers of film, television and entertainment, the radio 
listeners, these millions of individuals seem not to have entered into 
Wright’s calculations.13 
Wright’s statement of copyright’s purpose, contemplated only two 
elements of the schema of interests nowadays consulted in discussions 
of copyright policy. In 1968, however, only Coalition dissenters, and 
Bryant of the Labor Party, suggested that laws directed towards 
assisting the creators and producers of copyright material should  
also operate to the benefit of those who paid to read, hear or view  
that material. 
The Senate carried on a perfunctory debate after Wright introduced the 
Bill. The Opposition repeated its complaint, made in the Lower  
House, that the Government rushed consultation. Otherwise the Labor 
Senators offered little criticism of the legislation. The Party’s  
main speaker, Senator Doug McClelland, followed his Lower  
House colleagues and demanded that the Government ensure that 
creators were “adequately protected in the interests of the creative arts 
in this nation”. 
                                                     
13 Modern policy debate casts the members of the public interchangeably as “users” 
and “consumers” of copyright material. Some observers draw a distinction between 
users and consumers: in their formulation, the makers of electronic networks 
market to “users”, who have autonomy to decide how to use computer systems to 
obtain and use information, while the content providers of film, television, print 
and the internet dictate the choices of “consumers”.  
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The Bill passed, almost entirely unchanged, in June 1968. In 1905 and 
1912 members of the Senate supplied the most perceptive and 
searching commentary on copyright legislation. In 1968, Senators said 
little about the Copyright Bill. Reasons for the change are not hard to 
find. The earlier senators, those of 1905 and some in 1912, were a more 
fearless breed, and the world they inhabited, less beholden to special 
pleading and special interest. Independent and willing to ignore party 
principle, they were, above all, resolute in placing the interests of their 
country before any others. 
A new era 
The debates of 1968 signalled the beginning of a new era in which 
policy-makers considered government accountable to interests of not 
only the creators and producers but also the public – the “users” (or 
“consumers”) of contemporary parlance. Connor’s scheme for 
commissariats of the arts marked the start of Labor’s support for the 
little people in preference to the public. His colleague Gordon Bryant 
expressed concern that the legislation neglected the interests of the 
libraries and their public, but his Party ignored him. 
It fell to Coalition dissenters, abetted by Bryant, to advocate the public 
interest. One criticised restrictions on the importation of records and 
two attacked the mechanical performing right, this “monstrous 
distortion”, in the words of Buchanan, that operated to the 
disadvantage of radio broadcasters and the listening public. All critics 
regarded the new rights delivered to the copyright industries as inimical 
to the real purpose of copyright. All were unambiguously supporters of 
authors’ rights and they considered that the new industrial copyrights 
could not be justified in principle. Only by distortion and corruption of 
principle could they in any way be justified.  
The Government paid no attention to any of the critics. Outside 
Parliament, the public uttered no words over the copyright legislation 
until 1969. Earlier, in 1967, the Sydney Morning Herald, in a short 
editorial that reproached the Government for taking so long to 
implement the recommendations of the Spicer Committee, gave the 
first Copyright Bill “a hearty welcome”.  
In 1969, the Herald registered the first salvos in the still-continuing war 
between libraries and copyright owners’ groups. Debate began in 
August when Alan Horton, the General Secretary of the Library 
Association of Australia, responded to the threat of the Australian 
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Copyright Council to prosecute libraries and schools for photocopying 
books. He declared the reproduction of whole books, “entirely 
improper”, but disagreed with the ACC’s claim that students using 
coin-operated photocopying machines in libraries were “flagrantly” 
breaching the new Copyright Act. 
According to the Library Association, to ban the photocopying of 
extracts in public and university libraries could “interfere with the free 
dissemination of information.” In September, Horton and Gus 
O’Donnell, the Chairman of the ACC debated the issue of legitimate 
copying for educational purposes in the pages of the Herald. A school 
student, Patricia York, joined the debate, pointing out the possible 
administrative consequences of draconian enforcement of the fair 
dealing and library provisions in the Act. 
“May I ask?” she wrote, “what the authors, composers and publishers 
want? An inundation of letters from students asking to make a copy? A 
grand court case involving thousands of students? Or a lump sum from 
a Government which can ill afford it?” O’Donnell hastened to assure 
her of his organisation’s “great sympathy” and noted that all that “the 
council is saying is that excessive making of copies in schools is not  
fair dealing.” 
Her question went unanswered. What did creators want? And to what 
extent were their wishes consistent with then needs of the public? 
These matters would be debated for decades. But the truth is that the 
Australian public in 1968 was uninterested in the new Copyright Act. 
Superficially, it seemed to change little: for the copyright industries, for 
authors and for students, business carried on as usual. 
Summary of the 1968 Act 
The Copyright Act 1968 is a creature, or more accurately, a younger first 
cousin, of the British Act of 1956. Although said, when originally 
passed, to be better drafted and better arranged, it adopted the 
substance of the British Act’s provisions and followed exactly the 
fundamental categories of the British legislation. 
Part I contained preliminary provisions, Part II dealt with matters of 
interpretation and in Part III, the nature and scope of copyright in 
works was set out. In orderly, comprehensible fashion, Part III 
specified the rights accruing to the owners of copyright in works, the 
copyright term, the types of infringement, the varieties of fair dealing, 
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other miscellaneous acts that did not constitute infringement, the 
libraries’ copying privileges and the content of the compulsory licence. 
Part IV established a category previously unknown in Australian law: 
that of, ‘subject matter other than works’. The Act set out the nature of 
copyright in subject matter other than works – sound recordings, 
cinematograph films, television and sound broadcasts and the 
published editions of works – in plain terms. The old confused regime, 
in which films were recognised as a species of artistic works and 
broadcasts and published editions not recognised at all, disappeared. As 
in Part III, types of infringement were specified and the acts, including 
fair dealing, not constituting infringement, were laid out. 
Part V dealt with remedies and offences, Part VI the constitution  
and functions of the Copyright Tribunal, Part VII the right of the 
Crown to use copyright material as-of-right subject to equitable 
remuneration, and Part VIII the application of the Act to foreign 
nationals and institutions. 
The legislation thus introduced two distinct categories of copyright 
subject matter, ‘works’ and ‘subject matter other than works’, to the 
Australian statute books. These categories recognised the distinct 
interests of creators and producers. If the two recognised interest 
groups, creators and producers, disagreed over the amount of royalties 
payable for the use of material, they had recourse to the Copyright 
Tribunal, as did the record companies and the broadcaster in the event 
of commercial dispute. 
The Act also recognised the public interest in access to copyright 
material on fair terms, at least partially, in the fair dealing and library 
provisions. The Act protected Crown use, with the result that it could 
be said the Act protected the interests of authors and producers while 
ensuring that the exclusive rights did not operate to wholly exclude 
government and public from the gratuitous use of copyright material. 
Much about the new legislation seemed admirable. In drafting and 
arrangement it seemed lucid and coherent and it proved to work in 
practice. The prediction in 1968 of the Labor Senator, Doug 
McClelland, that “having regard to the problems that this Bill will 
create for professional creative people in this country … another Bill of 
this nature will certainly be before this chamber within five years” 
proved unfounded. The Act also had a great weakness: it failed really to 
secure for the public access to a broad range of copyright material at 
low prices. The import monopoly remained, with more provisions 
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added in favour of the copyright owner and the fair dealing and library 
provisions, supposedly designed to advantage the public, could be said 
to hedge with provisos what should be a birthright of citizens: to hear 
and to see without always to be reaching into their pockets. 
 
